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LAW AND THE PARAMETERS OF
ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE
MARK A. EDWARDS*
It can be useful to think of law as a standard around which we construct
parameters of acceptable deviance (PADs). Behavior that occurs within
PADs usually is not sanctioned, despite its illegality; behavior that occurs
outside PADs is often sanctioned, regardless of its legality. This Article
examines the construction of PADs, arguing that they are the product of
continuous interplay between formal law and the normative sensibilities of
the regulated and their regulators. The Article then attempts to explain why
institutions of regulation and enforcement cannot formally acknowledge
PADs without altering them. Finally, it demonstrates explanatory power of
PADs applied to a range of otherwise puzzling or bedeviling legal
phenomena, such as racial profiling, jury nullification, and even the
Supreme Court's controversial decision in Bush v. Gore.
I. INTRODUCTION
What's the speed limit?'
The explanatory power of one answer to that apparently innocuous
question provides a useful and rich conceptualization of law that can shine
light on the dynamic relationship between the regulated and their regulators,
and guide lawmakers in their policy decision-making. Moreover, it can link
together the most mundane and ubiquitous legal phenomena, such as the
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. For their insight and
generosity of time and spirit, I'd like to express deep gratitude to Marc Galanter, Howard
Erlanger, Michael Smith, Walter Dickey, and Herman Goldstein.
By using speed limits as a launching point-but only as a launching point-for this
study, I hope to avoid sinking into the quicksand of traffic law minutiae that swallowed
Underhill Moore, at least according to John Henry Schlegel. See John Henry Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill
Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 195 (1980); see also Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law
and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943) (a detailed-some
say too detailed-study of traffic and parking behaviors). But see Ian Ayres et al., To Insure
Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005) (an insightful
study of taxicab tipping dedicated to Moore for his pioneering work).
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decision of a police officer to stop a driver for a traffic violation, with the
most spectacular and rare, such as the decision of the Supreme Court to
intervene in the presidential election in 2000.
II. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL NORMS ON ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
There is a well-recognized gap between law-on-the-books, or formal
law, and law-as-enforced. This is apparent nowhere so much as in criminal
law; as Kenneth Culp Davis recognized long ago, there are "two sides"
within criminal law-"the formality and the reality.",2 The formality, in
Davis's classic formulation, exists "in statute books and in opinions of
appellate courts."3  Reality, by contrast, "is found in the practices of
enforcement officers."4  These practices vary widely: "[S]ome law is
always or almost always enforced, some is never or almost never enforced,
and some is sometimes enforced and sometimes not." 5 There is a parallel
gap between law-on-the-books and law-as-behaved. As Tom Tyler
explained, despite continuous efforts by regulators over long periods of
time, the regulated simply do not conform their behavior to formal law in
many areas.6  Some law is always or almost always behaved, some is
almost never behaved, and some is sometimes behaved and sometimes not.
If the formal law is neither behaved nor enforced, how do regulators
and the regulated find behavioral and enforcement standards that leave most
people free from coercive enforcement most of the time, regardless of the
legality of their behavior, yet subject the most extreme behaviors to
coercive enforcement most of the time?
Scholars have taken serious interest in the social forces that guide the
regulated's compliance decisions.7 Much scholarship has focused on the
powerful effect of social norms on those decisions across legal boundaries.8
2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 73 (1975).
3Id.
4 id.
' Id. at 1.
6 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19 (1990) ("[Plolice officers and judges have
been unable to stop" many types of illegal behavior "from tax evasion to drunk driving and
drug abuse.").
7 See id.
8 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1159 (2004); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path
of the Law Ands, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 375 (1997); Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social
Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633 (2003); Tracey L. Meares
& Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oJ) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805
(1998); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839 (2000); Lior Jacob
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Many years ago, Stewart Macaulay showed that norms of social behavior
are often more powerful than the law;9 that is, behavioral decisions, even
those made within a law-based relationship, are often made with reference
to norms first, law second.' 0 Macaulay's insights focused on civil law, but
they apply to criminal as well; as Paul Robinson explains, "criminal law's
power to influence conduct may reside in large part in its normative rather
than its coercive crime control mechanisms.""
Less attention has been paid to the effect of norms on discretionary
enforcement decisions. Although commentators have debated how much
discretion institutions of enforcement and actors within them should have,
12
and whether particular exercises of discretion are wise or just,' 3 few have
examined the social forces that guide discretionary enforcement decisions.
To the extent regulators' enforcement decisions do not adhere to
enforcement of the formal law-that is, to the extent they are formally
"deviant"-we may ask, as we do for the regulated, what is guiding their
decision-making. Both enforcement and compliance decisions are exercises
of discretionary behavior. If enforcement and compliance are both kinds of
discretionary behavior, then both are subject to the social forces that
influence behavior. It is not surprising, therefore, that close examination
reveals that just as the regulated are guided by norms in their compliance
discretion, regulators are guided by norms in their enforcement discretion.
An example from the frozen sidewalks of Madison, Wisconsin, 14 helps
to illustrate the point.'5 In the winter months, Madison deploys sidewalk
snow inspectors-men and women whose job it is to enforce the city's
sidewalk-clearing ordinance following a snowstorm. The ordinance is
specific: property owners must clear, free of snow and ice, at least a three-
Strahilevitr, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
359 (2003); Symposium, Symposium on Norms, Law, and Order in the City, 34 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 129 (2000).
9 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
10 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?
Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151 (1984).
1 Robinson, supra note 8, at 1841.
12 See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1299,
1321 (1997) ("For some, (discretion] justifies that government by securing flexibility and
opening a space for empathy .... For other observers, probably the larger number, discretion
condemns modern government because it violates the rule of law.") (footnotes omitted).
13 Id.
14 Chosen for convenience sake alone; that is where I reside.
15 See Doug Erickson, Policing the Snowy Paths, WIs. ST. J., Feb. 22, 2006, at Al.
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foot wide path no later than noon of the day following each snowfall.16 But
its enforcement is guided not just by its terms, but also by the inspectors'
normative sensibilities.
For example, in February 2006, an inspector measured a cleared path
in front of an apartment complex. 17 It was two feet wide at its widest point,
and narrower elsewhere: a clear violation. Still, he wrestled with whether to
enforce the ordinance, describing it as "a tough call."'' 8 Ultimately, keeping
in mind that most wheelchairs are wider than two feet, he decided to issue a
citation, explaining, "If it's a big business, I'm OK with it. It's not the
greatest feeling when you're beating up Grandma."' 9
In contrast to the "tough calls," some decisions to enforce are "no-
brainers.,,20 For example, he did not hesitate to cite a business that had
made no attempt to clear any of the eight-inch deep snow from its sidewalk;
he had cited this business twice previously during the same winter.2,
In short, the inspector had created a taxonomy of enforcement that did
not exist in the ordinance. "Grandma's" violations were not subject to
enforcement; it was a "tough call" when a non-Grandma had made some
effort toward compliance; enforcement against a non-Grandma who made
no effort toward compliance was a "no-brainer." The blueprint for this
taxonomy was not the ordinance; it was the inspector's normative
sensibility, one likely shared by and derived from others in his community,
regulators and regulated alike. Consequently, at least on his beat, that
normative sensibility became the effective ordinance.
More than forty years ago, Herman Goldstein, then Executive
Assistant to the Chicago Police Superintendent, discussed a remarkably
similar issue.22  A Chicago ordinance prohibited four-wheeled vehicles
from being driven on sidewalks.23 Chicago police arrested a man who was
clearing snow from his neighborhood sidewalks by driving a snowplow on
them, in clear violation of the ordinance.24 The department found, to its
horror, that the community was "enraged" by the arrest.25 To the
community, there were degrees of acceptability for driving on sidewalks,
16 Id. at A1, A7
17 Id. at Al.











even though forms of driving on the sidewalk were formally deviant.
Driving on the sidewalk for one's own convenience was unacceptably
deviant; driving on the sidewalk to help neighbors clear snow was
acceptably deviant.
The fact that the police had enforced the law made no difference to the
public, because the police were not expected to enforce the law; they were
expected to enforce the limit of normatively acceptable deviance. In
response, the police adapted their enforcement practices to the regulated's
normative sensibility: "Members of the department no longer arrest the
drivers of four-wheel sidewalk plows; the ordinance, however, remains on
the books. We have just decided not to enforce it."
26
Goldstein reported similar uproar over no-fault enforcement
practices.27 For example, formal law required police to cite motorists
driving with a non-working headlight, regardless of fault.28 The local press
joined public condemnation of the practice, summarizing the popular
argument as "the motorist who purposely breaks the law deserves to be
punished" but that otherwise enforcing the law was not "sensible., 29 The
police responded by tailoring their enforcement practices to match popular
sentiment: officers were instructed to issue citations if they believed the
motorist had ample time to fix the headlight but had refused.3° In other
words, the community's normative sensibility added the element of mens
rea to the formal law, and the police decided to enforce the law-as-
rewritten-by-normative-sensibility, rather than the law-as-written.3'
Similarly, in his study of the enforcement of strict liability criminal
laws governing wildlife conservation, Frank Remington discovered that the
wardens charged with enforcing strict liability statutes had effectively read
the element of mens rea back into them.32 He found that game wardens
would not usually arrest a hunter in a no-hunting area, unless the hunter
26 Id.
27 Id. at 147.
28 Id. Goldstein dryly reports that "[h]ad an effort been made, it is doubtful if one could
have devised a more effective way of antagonizing the public." Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.; see also John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of Criminal Law, 35 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 165, 184 (2001) ("One way to avoid the application of criminal sanctions is to
construe the statute in question as requiring a 'willful' mens rea, as requiring, in other words,
a realization on the part of the actor that the conduct was illegal and, since no such
realization was plausible, acquitting the actor.").
32 Frank J. Remington et al., Comment: Liability Without Fault Criminal Statutes-Their
Relation to Major Developments in Contemporary Economic and Social Policy: The
Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 625 (1956).
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tried to hide from the warden-by hiding, the hunter revealed a guilty mind,
indicating that he knew he was in a no-hunting area and had intentionally
33entered it anyway. By basing enforcement decisions on the presence of a
guilty mind in defiance of the statute's strict liability scheme, the wardens
had aligned their enforcement practices with what they perceived through
their "day-by-day, warden-meets-offender" experience as the community's
normative sensibility: that liability without fault was simply unfair.34
Insisting upon it, the wardens believed, would endanger "public
cooperation" with the broader goals of wildlife conservation.35
Grattet and Jenness have insightfully observed that police departments
"are places where law is given meaning. ,36 Statutes "cast[] a shadow" over
policing but do not determine what police do.37 But as Goldstein and
Remington noted, regulators such as police are not alone in giving the law
meaning. The real meaning of law is also generated within the "realms that
it seeks to regulate., 38  "Meaning-making... is distributed across
traditionally understood boundaries between 'inside' and 'outside' of the
legal system."
39
In each of these instances, formal law is neither behaved nor enforced.
But the result is not chaos. Those charged with enforcing the law
frequently exercise their discretion in a manner that enforces norms instead,
just as those charged with complying with it frequently exercise their
discretion in a manner that complies with norms instead. As Edward Rubin
has explained:
Weakening the formal controls may increase random variations in behavior, but its
only consistent effect will be to increase the effects of informal norms. Very often, it
is the strength or acceptability of the informal norms that makes weakened control
acceptable.... In any event, the behavior, even when the controls are weakened, is
likely to reveal a pattern.
4 0
" Id. at 665.
34 Id.
" Id. at 664.
36 Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency
Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 893, 935 (2005).
37 Id.
38 Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 LAW & Soc'y REv. 181, 189 (2004).
39 Grattet & Jenness, supra note 36, at 935.
40 See Rubin, supra note 12, at 1322-23.
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Il1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF PARAMETERS OF ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE
The pattern revealed by law-as-behaved is informed by, but not
identical to, informal norms alone. Law and norms are not autonomous;
they co-exist in an endogenous system, influencing each other in a
continuous, evolving cycle of cause and effect. 41  Norms express the
collective moral sensibility that gives rise to law42 and also serve as a
heuristic for law.43 Law has an anchoring effect on normatively acceptable
behavior;44 it symbolizes moral and normative commitments; 45 it expresses
values that become assumed; 46 and it evokes the norm of law-obeying for
its own sake.47 Norms help create and sustain law, and law helps create and
sustain norms. Most importantly, their interplay creates a third space that is
occupied, over time, by a range of normatively acceptable behaviors that is
neither synonymous with formal law nor independent of it.
Foucault hinted at the existence of this dynamic. "Order," he wrote,
"is at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner
law," and also "that which has no existence except in the grid created by a
glance, an examination, a language. 48 The first of these orders corresponds
with norms, at least as we usually perceive them. Norms sometimes seem
natural, factual, a given; they arrive without debate and are internalized
41 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc., 406, 407 (1999) ("[T]he content and meaning
of law is determined within the social field that it is designed to regulate.").
42 See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621
(1998).
43 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman,
et al. eds., 1982).
44 See Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations
of Deviance, 15 SoC. PROBS. 175 (1967); see also Karene M. Boos & Eric J. Boos, At the
Intersection of Law and Morality: A Descriptive Sociology of the Effectiveness of Informed
Consent Law, 5 J.L. Soc'Y 457 (2004).
45 See Joseph R. Gusfield & Jerzy Michalowicz, Secular Symbolism: Studies of Ritual,
Ceremony and Symbolic Order in Modern Life, 10 ANN. REV. SoC. 417, 423-24 (1984).
46 In Robinson's words, "the influences of social group sanctions and internalized norms
are the most powerful determinants of conduct, more significant than the threat of deterrent
legal sanctions. But .... [c]riminal law, in particular, can influence the norms that are held
by the social group and that are internalized by the individual." Robinson, supra note 8, at
1863; see also Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586
(1998) (by expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new
equilibrium).
47 See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1423-24
(2002).
48 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES xx (Vintage Books 1973) (1970).
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without conscious decision. The second of these orders corresponds with
law, composed of our own reflections upon what seems a natural order.
Law does not seem to arise from within us; it is produced by autocratic fiat
or legislative negotiation and arrives as an externality, with its deep origins
as a reflection upon what seems a natural order obscured. Unlike norms,
which do not require formal reduction to language in the form of
codification, law has no existence except through language. Law cannot
exist outside language unless it coincides with norms, and a law that
coincides with norms and is not reduced to language has no existence
distinct from the norm with which it coincides.
Norms and law, then, are "primary codes" that guide us. 49  But,
Foucault explained, in operating together, these two forces create a third
order, neither norm-autonomous-from-law nor law itself.5° This is the
space within which much behavior occurs:
5'
But between these two regions, so distant from one another, lies a domain which, even
though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless fundamental: it is more
confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to analyse. It is here that a culture,
imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary
codes, instituting an initial separation from them ... frees itself sufficiently to
discover that these orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best
ones .... Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering
codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and its
modes of being.5 2
Thus, there is a range of behaviors that are neither compliant with, nor
independent of, law. It is deviance informed by norms and anchored by law
that occurs within parameters of acceptability.
These parameters of acceptable deviance (PADs) are the limit of
behavior that is normatively acceptable to most of the regulated and their
regulators, and the informal standard that triggers enforcement by regulators
and social sanctions by the regulated. They encompass law-as-behaved and
define law-as-enforced. The regulated and their regulators, both guided by
norms and anchored by law, find a mode of behavior that is formally
deviant but normatively acceptable and that does not trigger enforcement.
When discretionary enforcement is exercised based upon a normative
sensibility shared by the regulated and regulators, and anchored by law,
49 See id.





PADs become the informal, but very real, law. They define the "experience
of order.,
53
The 2x2 box in Figure 1 depicts the effect of the relationship between
legality and normative acceptability on enforcement.
Figure 1






Behavior that is both formally legal and within PADs falls within the
upper left box. Enforcement against behaviors that are both legal and
within PADs is in error. Enforcement may be the product of
misinterpretation of either the formal law or the behavior. 4
In the lower left box are behaviors that are legal but outside PADs.
These are the opposite of acceptably deviant behaviors-they are
unacceptably compliant. For example, driving the speed limit in the middle
lane of an interstate highway is formally legal, but normatively
unacceptable; so is covering a front lawn with plastic pink flamingos in




54 Of course, that misinterpretation may have been arrived at either in good faith or
willfully.




behaviors is conceivable, but so awkward as to be unlikely. 6  In the
absence of formal enforcement, communities often impose their own
informal social sanctions-the unacceptably complaint driver might find
himself subject to sanctions such as tailgating, horn-blowing, headlight-
flashing, and obscene gestures, while the flamingo-lover could find her
lawn vandalized or herself ostracized.
In the lower right box are behaviors that are both illegal and outside
PADs, such as most forms of sexual contact between adults and young
children. Enforcement against these behaviors is expected. Non-
enforcement, in these cases, suggests that factors other than the illegality
and normative unacceptably of the behavior may be driving enforcement
decisions. These might include political influence, bribery, or simply
inadequate enforcement resources.
The upper right square encompasses behaviors that are formally illegal
but within PADs, such as Goldstein's example of driving with a faulty
headlight.5 Enforcement against behavior that is formally illegal but within
PADs is unusual and, therefore, suspect. Because enforcement is not
usually triggered by these behaviors, enforcement may be motivated by
factors other than the defendant's behavior. As I will discuss in Section V,
when enforcement is triggered by behavior that falls within PADs, courts
should recognize a duty to apply heightened scrutiny to the motivation
behind enforcement.
Figure 2 offers another way to visualize the dynamic relationship
between law and PADs. Formal law is the standard around which PADs
flow. As seen in Figure 2, enforcement is unexpected against behaviors
that are formally deviant but within the parameters of acceptability. Indeed,
the behavioral mean might exist somewhere between the formal law and the
limit of normatively acceptable deviance. On the other hand, it is expected
that formal enforcement will occur against behaviors that are both
formatively deviant and outside the parameters of acceptability. Informal
social sanctions might be expected against behaviors that are formally
compliant but normatively unacceptable (such as the "pink flamingo"
behavior).
56 For example, police could rely on vague notions such as "flow of traffic" to stop a
compliant driver, see Raymond, supra note 47, at 1427 n.139, and a zoning board could
invoke some standard of reasonable aesthetics. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to
Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781 (2005).
57 See supra note 28.
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Figure 2
















Implicit agreement on the location of PADs seems to be generated
through day-to-day interactions between the regulated and their regulators.
Like parties bargaining over the terms of divorce "in the shadow of the
law,, 58 the regulated and their regulators negotiate the terms of acceptable
deviance in the shadows of law and norms. Negotiation over the location of
PADs seems to be a macro-level social process derived from innumerable
micro-level enforcement experiences. Eventually an "implicit social
contract" locating PADs is derived from "shared expectations that evolve
from repeated interactions over time between regulatory authorities and
regulatees. '59 The social process that produces an implicit social contract
locating PADs might usefully be called negotiation-through-practice.
i. Speed limits
Speed limits provide a useful opportunity to observe negotiation-
through-practice in action for several reasons. First, it is difficult to think of
58 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
59 Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW &






another instance in which the content of a law is presented to the public on
large signs again and again. The ubiquity of speed limit signs dulls our
awareness of how unique, in fact, they are. 60  Nowhere else does the
government go to such extraordinary effort to inform its citizens about the
content of law. Speed limits are probably the formal law about whose
content the regulated receive the most extensive notice. If law and norms
both influence behavior, it might be expected that the relative influence of
norms would be stronger when the content of formal law is less well-
known. It is useful to examine speeding behavior, therefore, because if
norms influence compliance decisions even when the formal law is well-
known, then we should probably expect norms to influence behavior when
the requirements of formal law are less obvious.
Second, the enactment of new formal law, or changes in existing law,
present the opportunity to watch negotiation-through-practice in action, as
new PADs are established around the new law. In 1987, Congress amended
the law regulating speed limits on interstate highways to allow states to
raise the speed limit on intrastate portions of highways from 55 mph to 65
mph.6' Some states that have experimented with changes in speed limits
have gathered data regarding driving behaviors before and after those
changes.
For example, in 1996, Iowa raised the speed limit from 55 mph to 65
mph on Route 20, a rural interstate highway which enters from Illinois into
Dubuque on Iowa's eastern border, and exits into Nebraska through Sioux
City on Iowa's western border.62 The Iowa Department of Transportation
monitored driving behavior on portions of Route 20 before and after the
change.63
Figure 3 is a chart that shows the percentage of drivers in compliance
with speed limits on a representative portion of Route 20, from County
Road 38 to Dubuque, both before the new speed limit was enacted, and
after the change.64 It shows that approximately 30% of drivers were in
compliance with the 55 mph speed limit in 1995. The speed limit was then
raised to 65 mph to better reflect actual driving behavior. Immediately after
the speed limit was raised to 65 mph, the percentage of drivers in
60 Imagine, for example, awaking one morning to find the time limit for adverse
possession or the statutory elements of battery posted every few hundred yards.
61 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., BEYOND THE LIMITS: A LAW ENFORCEMENT
GUIDE TO SPEED ENFORCEMENT (1992).
62 Data for this graph was compiled from IOWA HIGHWAY SAFETY MGMT. SYS. TASK





compliance with the speed limit rose to approximately 60%, capturing a
large percentage of the drivers who had been driving at deviant speeds in
1995.
By 1997, however, the percentage of drivers in compliance with the 65
mph speed limit fell to approximately 42%. In the following years, the
percentage in compliance drifted generally downward, but slowly and in a
narrow range. By 2001, the last year for which data is available, the
percentage of drivers in compliance with the 65 mph speed limit had fallen
to approximately 35%, a level just slightly higher than the percentage in
compliance with the 55 mph speed limit, before the new limit was
implemented.
Figure 3











30-- at55 mph, in 1995
25 -
20
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Similar trends are observable before and after the speed limit changes
in Indiana.65 Figure 4 shows the 85th percentile speed for drivers on
Indiana rural interstate highways before and after the speed limit was raised
from 55 mph to 65 mph.66 The 85th percentile speed is the speed at which
65 See NISAR KHAN, KUMARES C. SINHA & PATRICK S. MCCARTHY, IND. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., AN ANALYSIS OF SPEED LIMIT POLICIES FOR INDIANA (2000).
66 Data for this chart was compiled using id.
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or below 85% of drivers drive. Between 1981 and 1987, when the speed
limit remained 55 mph, the 85th percentile speed fluctuated between
approximately 63 mph and 68.5 mph. In 1987, the last year of the 55 mph
limit, the 85th percentile speed was approximately 66 mph.
After the speed limit on Indiana rural interstate highways was raised in
1988, the 85th percentile speed rose sharply, peaking at 73.9 mph in 1989.
It then fell, rose again, then fluctuated within a very narrow range for the
final four years for which data was available.
Figure 4













64 1987: Speed limit changed from 55 mph to 65 mph
63,
62
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A similar pattern is revealed by data collected on highways in Kansas,
although that study was limited to just three years.67 The data show that the
85th percentile speed in 1996, when the speed limit was 55 mph, was 66.9
mph. In the year following the increase in speed limits to 65 mph, the 85th
percentile speed rose to 70.9. Over the next two years, the 85th percentile
speed moved within a narrow range; the last year for which data is available
shows the 85th percentile speed was 71.4.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
compared raw speed data aggregated from eighteen states gathered at two
points in time--one before and one after the speed limit was increased from
67 YACOUB M. NAJJAR ET AL., KAN. DEP'T OF TRANSP., IMPACT OF NEW SPEED LIMITS ON
KANSAS HIGHWAYS (2000).
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55 mph and 65 mph.68 As depicted in Figure 5, NHTSA data show that in
1986, when the speed limit was 55 mph, approximately 22% of drivers
exceeded 65 mph.69 In 1989, following the speed limit increase, the
percentage of drivers exceeding 65 mph had jumped to 45%. But a year
later, that percentage had hardly moved, and stood at 44%.
Figure 5













40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
MPH
A basic pattern can be discerned in each of the above instances.
Changes in the speed limit are accompanied by a predictable series of
changes in driving behavior. Initially, the level of formally deviant
behavior is relatively low, but it then rises quickly over a relatively short
time before stabilizing and then moving in a narrow range.7°
68 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EFFECTS OF THE 65 MPH SPEED LIMIT
THROUGH 1990: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1992).
69 Data for this chart was compiled using id.
70 In their study of driving behaviors in Montana following the elimination of a
numerical speed limit on interstate highways in favor of a "reasonable and prudent"
standard, King and Sunstein similarly found that "most citizens appeared to coordinate their
behavior around a certain area of appropriate speed" both before and after the elimination of
the numerical speed limit, leading them to conclude that "much driving behavior is governed
by informal norms." Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79
B.U. L. REv. 155 (1999). They found that over time there emerged a shared "judgment
about what kinds of behavior would count as unreasonable and imprudent." Id.
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ii. Drunk Driving
This pattern of behavior is mirrored when drunk driving laws are made
more restrictive. In several landmark studies, H. Laurence Ross collected
data on changes in drunk driving behavior following changes in laws in
several European countries. 71 In Britain throughout 1966 and the first half
of 1967, on average, there were 1200 fatalities or serious injuries per month
resulting from crashes between the hours of 10:00 p.m. Friday until 4:00
a.m. Saturday, and 10:00 p.m. Saturday until 4:00 a.m. Sunday.72
Following the enactment of the Road Safety Act in September 1967, 73 the
number of fatalities or serious injuries dropped to around 400. 74 Then the
numbers began a steady rise.75 After one year, the monthly total had
climbed to 800. From that point, the number of fatalities or injuries moved
in a slowly increasing but narrow range. By December 1970, there were
1,000, and the rate of change had declined significantly.76
Ross found similar results in France following adoption in July 1978
of a law known colloquially as the "Alcotest" law.77 The law allowed
police to administer blood alcohol tests to any driver they stopped, and
revoke the driver's license if his blood alcohol level was above .08 pro
mille.78 As was the case in Britain, considerable opposition to the law
created public awareness of it.79 Data show that in the months preceding
the law's enactment, the percentage of persons responsible for fatal crashes
with illegal blood-alcohol concentration stood as high as 60 %.
80 In the
months immediately following enactment, that percentage dropped as low
as 35%. 81 From there, however, the percentage began to rise again. 82 Five
71 H. LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL (Lexington Books 1984) (1982).
72 Id. at 30-31.
73 The Road Safety Act provided for roadside testing of blood alcohol levels and
criminalized driving when blood alcohol content exceeded the statutorily prescribed level.
H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1, 19 (1973).
74 Ross, supra note 71, at 30-3 1.
75 Id.
76 id.
77 Id. at 35-36.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 36-37.




PARAMETERS OF ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE
months after enactment, the percentage had risen to approximately 50% and
appeared to be leveling off.
8 3
iii. Tax Compliance
A similar trend appears in patterns of tax compliance in reaction to
changes in tax law and auditing standards. As shown in Figure 6,
researchers have found that compliance with income reporting requirements
increases immediately following a change in law, then levels off again over
time.84
Figure 6
Total Income Reporting Compliance
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Year
In their study of tax compliance following the 1986 tax code revisions,
Steenbergen et al. discovered that "social processes through which
individuals find out about the contents of new laws" had "considerably
more impact" on the level of compliance with formal law than "subjective
evaluations of the laws and objective measures of their impact., 85 These
83 id.
84 Data for this graph was compiled from INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE DETERMINANTS
OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY,
ENFORCEMENT AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS (1996).
85 Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do
New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES:
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 9, 9 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
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social processes may include both personal experiences with regulatory
agents 86 and gossip about the experiences of others.1
7
iv. Criminal Sentencing
Interestingly, judges appear to follow the same patterns of compliance
and deviance following the enactment of sentencing guidelines.88 As shown
in Figure 7, federal judges complied with federal sentencing guidelines in
non-plea bargaining cases 82% of the time during the guidelines' first year.
The compliance rate then rose slightly in the second year, then began a long
and steady fall, bottoming out ten years later in 2001 at 64%. Over the next
two years, compliance rose slightly.
Figure 7













1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
The pattern of behavior by judges in Minnesota following enactment
of state sentencing guidelines is almost identical to that of federal judges,
86 For example, unlucky taxpayers who have been target-selected for audit and penalized,
and then later randomly selected for audit again, have a much higher rate of compliance on
the second audit. See Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 85, at 95.
87 Steenbergen, supra note 85.
88 Data for this chart was compiled from the U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (1995-2003 annually), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
annrpts.htm.
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although the absolute increases in deviance were much smaller.89 As shown
in Figure 8, in 1981, the year after the Minnesota guidelines were first
enacted, judges complied with them nearly 94% of the time. 90 During the
next three years, compliance fell relatively sharply, accounting for
approximately half of the total increase in deviance between 1981 and 2003.
From 1985, compliance fell slowly until reaching 86% in 1997. From 1997
to 2000, compliance rose before falling again, then leveling off from 2002
to 2003.
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
Year
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
In sum, this data proves nothing. But it suggests a pattern of
negotiation-through-practice that constructs PADs. Changes in formal law
create uncertainty about how much deviation from it is acceptable. Over
time, through a process of day-by-day trial and error, regulators and the
regulated alike move toward an acceptable range of deviance. Because an
unknown risk often has more deterrent effect than a known one, 91 perhaps
89 MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, 2004 SENTENCING DEPARTURE DATA (2004),
available at http://www.msgc.state.nm.us/Data%20Reports/2004%20Departure%20
Data.doc.
90 Data for this chart was compiled using id.
91 See Deborah D. Frisch & Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 J. BEHAV.
Sentences in
Figure 8
Compliance with Minnesota Guidelines
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this is the reason why compliance with a new law seems highest when the
law itself, and the enforcement parameters that surround it, are unknown.
Briefly, therefore, behavior adheres relatively closely to the new formal
law.
As experience multiplies, more information is gathered about how
much deviance is acceptable to both the regulated and the regulators. As
the regulated gain experience with the new law and the probability of its
enforcement, and bring their own normative sensibilities to bear upon both,
compliance generally falls rapidly after the period of initial compliance.92
As Ross observed with regard to drunk driving laws:
Changes in behavior resulting from changes in the certainty of threat ... are
evanescent. The reductions in the indicators of drinking and driving have disappeared
after a few months or years .... Similar diminutions of effect are clear in all other
studies that have reported similar long-term postintervention data.
93
Ross's evidence revealed that the "Road Safety Act was initially effective"
in decreasing drunk driving, but that "this effect dissipated within a few
years."
94
However, the rapid fall in compliance does not extend indefinitely;
after the initial period of rapid increase in deviance, deviant behavior tends
to level off. Deviance may level off in the face of a "pushback" as deviance
approaches the limit of normative acceptability for the community,
regulators or-most likely-both. In some cases, the pushback may take
the form of an "enforcement campaign," which can generally be understood
as an attempt to contract PADs. This pushback may briefly induce an
increase in compliance after a long period of decline, followed by a period
of relative stability. The behavior that coalesces at that point may be the
parameter of acceptable deviance.
When modeled, the pattern might look like Figure 9. In Year 1
following the enactment of new formal law, the behavioral mean adheres
relatively closely to the new law. In Year 2, the level of deviance expands
rapidly. In Year 3, the level of deviance continues to expand until it meets
pushback in the form of enforcement by regulators or social sanction by the
regulated. By Year 4, the behavioral mean is relatively stable at a slightly
contracted level of deviance as compared to Year 3. At this point, most
DECISION MAKING 149 (1988).
92 See, e.g., Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Tax Ethics and Taxpayer
Attitudes: A Survey, 38 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 442 (1978) (publicity about the existing degree of
noncompliance may result in further increases in noncompliance as taxpayers change their
perceptions of social norms).
93 ROSS, supra note 71, at 103.
94 Id. at 31.
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people are observing established PADs, and enforcement against deviance
from the formal law takes place only outside of those PADs.
Figure 9
Negotiation-Through-Practice over Time Between Regulated and
Regulators Following Adoption of a New Standard Sets the Parameters of
Acceptable Deviance
Formal Law
Formal Compliance Formal Deviance
Behavioral means
Yr I Yr 2 Yr 4
Relative
Stasis







B. PADS AND LAW'S ANCHOR
Formal law may be neither obeyed nor enforced, but that does not
mean it is without influence on standards of behavior and enforcement. In
fact, it is quite the opposite. Confronted with uncertainty, "estimates are
often made from an initial value, or 'anchor,' which is then adjusted to
produce a final answer., 95  Changes in law seem to enhance the
gravitational pull of law's anchoring function, narrowing the range of
behaviors around it.
The anchoring effect should not be confused with deterrence. The data
do not suggest whether a change in norms precedes a change in law, or a
change in law precedes a change in norms. Michael Tonry has persuasively
95 Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 752 (2003).
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argued that cyclical changes in sensibilities cause changes in both behavior
and law.96 In other words, changes in law may not be the cause of changes
in behavior; instead, changes in behavior may be the result of the same
change in normative sensibility that prompted the change in law.97 As
Robinson and Darley have shown, the formulation of criminal law has a
deterrent effect only under narrow and unlikely circumstances.98
The anchoring effect of law on PADs may be more akin to the
phenomena of "reference transactions." 99  The presence of a reference
point, or suggested value, exerts a powerful anchoring influence on the
value people assign to a given phenomenon. For example, Guthrie et al.
conducted an experiment in which 168 federal magistrate judges were given
materials from a hypothetical tort case in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. 100 Half of the judges received a hypothetical that included a
motion to dismiss because the amount in controversy was allegedly less
than the statutory minimum of $75,000.'0 Everything else was identical.
The motion was clearly frivolous, and was denied by all but two of the
judges. 10 2 The judges were then asked to determine a monetary value for
damages in the case. The average damages award from the judges who did
not receive the motion to dismiss was $1.249 million. The average
damages award from the judges who did was $882,000. In other words,
even though the motion to dismiss was clearly frivolous and was dismissed
by nearly every judge, the suggestion that the damages may have been less
than $75,000 anchored the value that the judges eventually assigned to the
damages award. In the same way, the value suggested by law, whether
communicated literally or through the prism of enforcement practices, may
anchor what is considered to be normatively appropriate behavior.
The data above regarding actual speeds in relation to speed limits
following changes in speed limits may show the anchoring effect at work.
The actual speeds that become normatively acceptable as a limit of behavior
96 See MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE (2004).
97 Id.
98 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1842. Note, however, that although there may be no
deterrent effect from criminal law formulation due to the content of the new law, the data do
suggest that uncertainty about law and enforcement practices following the formulation of
criminal law may have a temporary deterrent effect.
99 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1496 (1998).






and enforcement are not the legal speed limits, but neither are the actual
speeds independent of the legal speed limits. For example, in Indiana,
when the speed limit is 55 mph, 85% of drivers drive at 63 mph or less.
When the speed limit is 65 mph, 85% drive at 72.5 mph. If the actual speed
limit had no anchoring effect, we would not expect to see a difference in
actual driving behaviors following the speed limit increase, and we would
not expect to see a similar, stable gap between speed limits and actual
speeds. For example, if formal law had no gravitational effect, drivers
might average speeds of 90 mph in a 65 mph zone. But the formal law does
have a gravitational effect on actual driving behaviors; in other words,
PADs are anchored by law.
The anchoring effect may also be a product of the availability heuristic
that sometimes accompanies a change in law. 10 3  People use mental
shortcuts in assessing the probability of any particular event; the assessment
of probability is linked to the ease with which the event can be brought to
mind.' 04 For example, the availability of information about the riskiness of
certain behaviors, accurate or not, effects risk assessment.' °5  "The
availability heuristic operates in an emphatically social environment," so to
the extent that the risk of harm influences the placement of the parameters
of normatively acceptable deviance, the placement of those parameters may
initially be affected by bursts of public information. 106 Ross found that
"extensive publicity campaigns" threatening interdiction have been
successful in temporarily decreasing drunk driving.
0 7
Ross suggests that the availability of information about interdiction
may cause potential offenders to overestimate their risk of detection.'
0 8
However, it seems equally possible that massive public campaigns may
influence the community's normative sensibility regarding the acceptability
of drunk driving, or that a change in the community's normative sensibility
about drunk driving might spur the massive publicity campaign. In either
case, the result would be a decrease in drunk driving. The decrease in
drunk driving Ross documented following enactment of the Road Safety
Act may be a testament to the bias in risk assessment caused by
"availability cascades,"' 0 9 or it may be a testament to law's anchoring
power. The increase in drunk driving behavior after that is a testament to
103 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 43.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and Real People, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 397, 403 (2000).
107 See Ross, supra note 73, at 76.
"' See id.
109 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 43; Sunstein, supra note 106.
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the power of normative acceptability in guiding behavior despite the
anchoring power of law. The leveling-off following those increases is
evidence of the establishment of parameters of deviance acceptable to the
regulated and their regulators.
The regulated may also be unaware that their behavior is formally
deviant. For the most part people do not know what the law is.' 10 People
ignorant of the law tend to assume that the law is whatever their own
normative sensibility is;'" such people might assume any number of
possibilities about the law's content. It is no coincidence that people
assume the law is consistent with their normative sensibilities. The focus
on the dissonance between law-as-written and law-as-understood misses the
fidelity between law-as-enforced and law-as-understood. Because people
generally do not read statute books, their impression about the content of
law may well come from their experience-vicarious or direct-of
enforcement practices. Absent exceptional practices like posting speed
limits, enforcement practices may be the most common means of
communicating the law's content to the regulated. As Remington,
Goldstein and others have shown, enforcement practices are informed and
sometimes defined by communities' normative sensibilities. It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that the community's impression of the law's
content is consistent with its own normative sensibilities; its normative
sensibilities are reflected back by enforcement practices which are based, in
part, on community normative sensibility. It is an endogenous system."
1 2
C. PADS AND SOCIAL FIDELITY
Tyler argues that regulators are aware that they cannot ignore
community sensibilities in exercising their enforcement discretion." 
3
Regulators, he suggests, are "concerned with making allocations and
resolving conflicts in a way that will both maximize compliance with the
decision at hand and minimize citizens' hostility toward the authorities and
institutions making the decision." ' 1 4  Tyler has shown that "the most
important normative influence on compliance with the law is the person's
assessment that following the law accords with his or her sense of right and
110 See Darley et al., supra note 31.
111 See id.
112 See Edelman et al., supra note 41.
113 See TYLER, supra note 6, at 25.
114 See id.
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wrong."" 5 When it does, he concludes, people become self-regulating, and
"self-regulating people are law-abiding" people." 6
Tyler is undoubtedly correct that, to the extent that law and normative
sensibilities coincide, compliance will be high. But Tyler's conclusion
misses an important point. If people obey the law when it coincides with
their normative sensibilities and disobey it when it does not, then law
disappears as an explanation for their behavior. People do not comply with
law, except to the extent that law-abiding behavior exists within the
parameters of normatively acceptable behavior. In other words, people are
not "law-abiding," but they are acceptable-deviance-abiding.
People may appear law-abiding because abiding by the standards of
acceptable deviance usually does not trigger an enforcement response.
Enforcement responses generate the statistics upon which researchers
usually measure compliance with formal law. Relying on enforcement
response statistics to measure compliance with formal law assumes that
deviation from formal law triggers an enforcement response. But in the real
world, deviance alone does not trigger enforcement; only unacceptable
deviance does. Relying on enforcement response statistics misses that
dynamic. Therefore, people may appear law-abiding, when in fact they
may be law-breaking but acceptable-deviance-abiding.
Moreover, utilitarian concerns about maximizing compliance with
formal law are probably not the only factor motivating enforcers'
willingness to accommodate community normative sensibilities. Indeed,
accommodating normative sensibilities may minimize compliance with
formal law. It is quite possible that enforcers are motivated to enforce
consistent with the community's normative sensibilities because they share
them. As H. Laurence Ross noted, "underlying the intellectual order of
black-letter law is a social order of legal actors, and these can be expected
to resist innovations that overturn established ways of doing things,
especially when such innovations are considered extreme and unfair."
'"17
Of course, the ability of the regulated and their regulators to achieve
agreement on acceptable behavior and enforcement depends in part on the
social fidelity between them, and on the relative absence of countervailing
pressures on institutions of enforcement to defy norms. The greater the
social fidelity between the regulated and their regulators, the more likely
they share normative sensibilities that guide both compliance behavior and
enforcement behavior. For some behaviors, particularly those traditionally
" See id. at 64.
116 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiii (2002).
117 Ross, supra note 71, at 96.
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defined as malum in se, there may be almost no gap between law, norm,
and parameter of acceptable deviance. To the extent law differs from
normatively acceptable behavior, shared norms between the regulated and
agents of enforcement may result in a diminished influence for law on
enforcement practices.
Strong social fidelity between the community and enforcers can cause
a '"sticky norms' pathology" that causes law enforcers to work at cross-
purposes with lawmakers trying to "change social norms" through
expanded liability for certain offenses.1 18 Kahan argues that because some
norms of behavior are more powerful than others, regulators react to
increases in liability for those behaviors by reducing enforcement against
them. 1 9 In other words, if the normative acceptability of the targeted
behavior is unchanged, and punishment is the product of the severity of
liability and the probability of enforcement, then an increase in liability will
result in a corresponding decrease in enforcement, leaving the quantum of
punishment unchanged. 20  He notes that "hard shoves" are often less
effective than "gentle nudges" at causing "norm reform" because resistance
to hard shoves is greater, and may even be counterproductive, strengthening
the existing norm by diminishing enforcement against it. 121
On the other hand, weak social fidelity between the regulated and
agents of enforcement may result in a diminished influence for the
community's normative sensibilities, to the extent that they differ from law.
Sarah Waldeck explores the social fidelity problem with regard to
community policing and the social norms theory of regulation. 122  As
Waldeck puts it, "one cannot endorse the social norms approach to
deterrence without placing tremendous faith in a police department's ability
to interpret and enforce norms, or in a community's ability to correct a
police force whose interpretation is misguided."' 123 Waldeck argues that the
social norms theory of enforcement is undermined unless it is accompanied
by a model of community policing that promotes fidelity between the
normative sensibilities of police and the public. 1
24
118 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
'19 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 644-45; see also WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967).
122 Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to
Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV.
1253 (2000).




Similarly, the ability of the regulated and their regulators to find an
enforcement standard along parameters of deviance acceptable to them both
depends, in part, on common normative sensibilities. When that is not
possible, dissonance creates odd dynamics, and formal institutions of
enforcement often falter. In these cases, attempts at enforcement are
motivated by influences other than the community's normative sensibilities,
regardless of whether agents of enforcement share them. The "other
influence" is simply the directive of formal law. Interestingly, in such
cases, it is enforcement itself that is the normatively unacceptable deviant
behavior. When regulators such as prosecutors insist upon enforcement
despite the normative acceptability of the offending behavior, it is often the
formal institutions of enforcement that falter. 12 5 As depicted in Figure 10,
pressure may develop to make the law align with normative sensibilities.
Figure 10
Enforcement as Normatively Unacceptable Deviance
Formal deviance Formal law Formal compliance
Formally deviant, Formally compliant,
normatively acceptable normatively unacceptable
behavior behavior






For example, because occasional marijuana use is within PADs in many
communities, and because such cases are often prosecuted zealously and
sentenced harshly, prisons may become distended and overcrowded, and
debate may arise about proper resource allocation.
In some cases, if the prohibited behavior is normatively acceptable
under certain conditions, the community may resist enforcement of a law,
125 As Roscoe Pound observed, in "all cases of divergence between the standard of
common law and the standard of the public, it goes without saying that the latter will prevail




even if it otherwise coincides with their normative sensibilities. 126  For
example, the prohibition against murder may coincide with normative
sensibilities under most circumstances, but not all: consider assisted suicide
for the terminally ill, suicide itself, lynching, honor-killing, and vigilantism.
All are formally illegal, but not all are outside PADs in all communities.
The prohibition on sexual relationships with children may coincide with
normative sensibilities under most circumstances, but not all. For example,
in the very recent past, marriage between men in their early twenties and
women in their early teens was not considered normatively unacceptable in
many communities in the United States. 127 Today, the enforcement of laws
prohibiting the sexual assault of children may coincide with community
normative sensibilities-except, perhaps, when applied in draconian fashion
to both sixteen year-old participants in a consensual sexual relationship
because, for many, such relationships (while discouraged) are not so far
outside the parameters of acceptable deviance as to warrant an enforcement
response. 128
Tellingly, it has become standard practice for political and business
elites accused of crimes to complain that they are the victims of politically
motivated prosecutors who have "criminalized" normatively acceptable
political and business practices. "9 The expectation that enforcement will be
guided by PADs rather than formal law is that powerful; the prosecuted
argue that their formally criminal behaviors have been "criminalized." As
discussed in detail in Section VI.A, below, the prosecution of formally
illegal behavior that is within PADs creates a host of difficulties.
126 Interestingly, not only are people likely to privilege their sense of fairness over law;
they are also likely to privilege it over their own self-interest. See Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAvIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 22 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
127 See, e.g., LORETTA LYNN, COALMINER'S DAUGHTER 49-52 (1976).
128 Megan Twoley, Teens Who Have Sex Charged with Abuse, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 8, 2004, at IA (discussing the community uproar over charging both sixteen year-old
participants in a consensual sexual relationship with sexual assault of a minor).
129 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bell & William Kristol, Editorial, Criminalizing Conservatives,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 24, 2005 (arguing the investigation of the Valerie Plame affair was
a "criminalization" of normal-albeit technically criminal-political practices); Robert
Novak, Criminalized Politics, Oct. 14, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/
2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/14/criminalized.politics/index.html (alleging the indictment of
(then) House Speaker Tom Delay was a "criminalization" of normal-albeit technically
criminal-political practices); Daniel J. Popeo, Criminalizing Success, http://www.wlf.org/
Communicating/inallfaimess.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (arguing prosecution of Arthur
Andersen was part of a "crusade to criminalize legitimate free market activity" without
regard to the technically criminal nature of those activities).
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Figure 11
Formal Compliance as Normatively Unacceptable Deviance
Formally deviant behavior Formal law Formally compliant behavior
Normatively
acceptable deviance Formal compliance/Normatively unacceptable deviance
Ex: 63 mph in high-speed lane
Informal social sanctions imposed to




Enforcement by formal institutions paralyzed or illogical
As depicted in Figure 11, just as people are inclined not to punish
behavior that is illegal but normatively acceptable, they are inclined to
punish behavior that is normatively unacceptable even if legal.1 30 Recall,
for example, the earlier discussion about the very slow driver, or the
neighbor with a passion for pink flamingoes. Other examples might include
cohabitation of same-sex or interracial couples. In the absence of
enforcement by formal institutions, informal social sanctions are imposed
by members of the community in order to push the behavior within PADs.
Community members may shun, pressure, or confront deviants; they may
even lynch them as a warning to others. 31  Formal institutions of
enforcement are not well-equipped to punish normatively unacceptable
legal behavior, because the acknowledged justification for their
intervention-violation of formal law-is unavailable.
"Acknowledged" may be the most important word in the preceding
sentence. As we have seen, violation of formal law is not an adequate
explanation for the exercise of enforcement discretion. Violation of PADs
is. But due in part to the operation of a phenomenon I describe as the
formalization paradox, formal institutions of enforcement cannot
acknowledge this concept.
130 See Jolls et al., supra note 126.
131 See, e.g., David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture
Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 793, 816 (2005).
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IV. PADS AND THE FORMALIZATION PARADOX
PADs are the product of dynamic interplay between law and norms.
Formal law has an effect upon the placement of PADs, just as PADs have
an effect on the content of formal law. Therefore, changes in law, norms, or
both should produce some change in PADs. The data cited above regarding
changes in behavior accompanying changes in law suggest this is true.
When the formal law was raised to a maximum consistent with actual
behavior, actual behavior shifted along with the formal law. In short order,
the new maximum was closer to, but no longer consistent with, actual
behavior. In other words, the shift in formal law was accompanied by a
shift in PADs. This idea is depicted in Figure 12 below.
Figure 12
The Formalization Paradox: Formal Acknowledgement ofAcceptable
Deviance Shifts PADs
Formal Law PAD
Acceptable Deviance Unacceptable Deviance
TimhaBeorarMean
Acceptabl Deviance Unacceptable Deviance
Time 2 Behavioral Mean
Formally Acknowledged Standard
PAD
That formal law and PADs shift together places formal institutions of
enforcement in a trap. If formal institutions of enforcement acknowledge
that PADs are an appropriate enforcement standard, then PADs have been
formalized. The law shifts so that PADs become the effective law. But
when the law shifts, PADs shift as well, creating new limits of acceptable
deviance.
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Speed limits are a useful example again. Speed limits are posted
everywhere; and yet, everywhere, both regulators and the regulated know
they are untrue. Why post an obvious untruth? The data above suggests an
answer. If regulators formally acknowledge that the enforced speed limit is,
say, 72 mph, then the limit of acceptable deviance would shift with that
formal acknowledgement and become some speed faster than 72,
negotiated-through-practice between drivers and the police over time.
Regulators use the fictional, formal 65 mph law to anchor the parameters of
deviance at an acceptable level.
The "broken windows" theory of policing can be understood as a
reaction against the formalization paradox. According to this theory,
permitting minor deviance (such as broken windows and graffiti on subway
cars) establishes a normative climate that accommodates greater
deviance.132 Put another way, the failure of police to enforce formal law
acknowledges that violations of that law are normatively acceptable. That
acknowledgement implicitly formalizes the legality of the behavior, and
shifts the PADs to encompass greater deviance. Advocates of the broken
windows theory urge enforcement against minor violations in order to
contract PADs.
It may be impossible for formal institutions of enforcement to
acknowledge PADs without affecting them. An enforcer who formally
acknowledges that enforcement occurs at the limit of acceptable deviance
rather than at the point of formal law is akin to a negotiator revealing her
"bottom line" during negotiations. It is highly unlikely that the final result
of the negotiations would be unaffected by that disclosure. 133 Thus, unless
regulators want to change PADs, they cannot acknowledge them.
As Goldstein observed, if PADs are acknowledged, they "become
known both to the violator and the officer." They then create "bargaining
power" for the regulated against their regulators.1 34 Prosecutors similarly
fear the formalization paradox; they are reluctant to create a written guide to
the exercise of discretion in the charging decision because such a guide may
fall into the public's hands.1 35  In short, acknowledgement by formal
institutions of enforcement of the existence of PADs turns the PADs into a
new formal standard and gradually, by negotiation-through-practice, new
PADs form around them.
132 See Waldeck, supra note 122, at 1256-57.
133 See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2003).
134 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 145.
135 See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations:
An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1439, 1494-95 (2004).
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V. PADS AND THE FORMAL FICTION
The formalization paradox has different implications for different
political institutions. For policymakers such as legislatures, the
formalization paradox can be a useful tool or an unwanted consequence.
Which it is depends on whether its potential is recognized and whether
decisions are made with it in mind. Wise policymakers can use formal law
as an anchor for PADs in order to achieve their policy goals.
Enforcement agencies are in a more difficult position. They are rarely
in a position to create law in order to anchor PADs to achieve specific
social goals. However, refusing to acknowledge PADs requires some
amount of implausible pretense.136 Even a cursory observation of the
operation of law in society makes clear that full enforcement of the law is
neither present nor desirable 37 nor possible. 138 Yet Kenneth Culp Davis
found that police departments refused to formally acknowledge that, and
136 Our complicity in the fiction may best be revealed by the habit of slowing down while
passing a police car parked along a highway. Even if we feel certain we will not be ticketed
despite speeding-in other words, we feel certain that our behavior is within PADs-we
slow down as if the parameter of enforcement was the actual speed limit, as a sign to the
police officer that we respect authority and are willing to play our part in the fiction that the
formal law is the standard of enforcement.
137 Either full enforcement or compliance would likely bring any functioning society to a
crashing halt. In other words, even if we are reluctant to acknowledge acceptable deviance,
we depend upon it. In some ways, the effects of full enforcement or compliance with formal
law can be seen by analogy in the labor tactic known as "work-to-rule." In work-to-rule
campaigns, employees work according to the letter of company policy in order to cripple
operations. See Loc. 702, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (defining work-to-rule as "adhering strictly to all company safety and other rules;
doing exactly and only what they were told; reporting to work precisely on time and parking
work trucks at company facilities at day's end (thus precluding employees from responding
to after-hours emergencies); presenting all grievances as a group; advising non-employees to
report unsafe conditions; and advising customers of their right to various company
information and of their right to have their meters checked annually for accuracy"); Pam
Galpern, Telephone Workers Pressure Verizon from Within, Troublemaker's Website,
http://troublemakershandbook.org/Text/Inside%20Strategies/fullchapter.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2006) (In a recent work-to-rule campaign, telephone workers pressured Verizon by
complying with Department of Transportation regulations and Verizon's own policies. They
started each morning with a twenty-minute inspection of each truck, ensured that they had
proper signage for each worksite, met each customer before and after every job, refused to
use fire escapes or work in inadequate lighting, and parked only in legal parking spaces. The
result crippled Verizon's operations, and brought a sharp response from Verizon.). Note that
full compliance with regulations and policies is regarded by labor and management alike as a
type of "troublemaking" deviant behavior. See DAN LA BOTz, A TROUBLEMAKER'S
HANDBOOK: HOW TO FIGHT BACK WHERE YOU WORK-AND WIN! 16-19 (1991). In other
words, compliance was outside PADs, and thus unacceptably deviant.
138 If only because the resources required for full enforcement far exceed those available
to regulators.
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instead maintained the "pretense of full enforcement.' 39 Institutions of
enforcement often feel compelled, at least publicly, to maintain the fiction
that formal law is the point of enforcement.
Courts are not commonly thought of as institutions of enforcement, but
"the judiciary's role is no different, in its essence, from that of any other
implementation mechanism."'' 40  A court's implementation function
requires it, in formal terms, to implement the law as written. 141 Like other
agents of enforcement, courts have difficulty acknowledging the existence
and operation of PADs, in part because of the formalization paradox. This
inability by the judiciary to acknowledge the existence and operation of
PADs traps them in a "formal fiction."
Courts' formal fiction dovetails with a widespread misperception
about courts and the law generally-what Ronald Dworkin calls the
"empirical view" of law. 42 Dworkin notes two general ways in which
lawyers and judges might disagree about a proposition of law.143 First, they
might disagree on what he calls "empirical" grounds. 144 A disagreement on
empirical grounds is a disagreement about positively ascertainable legal
facts. 14 5 For instance, the "law" exists as a fact in a statute, regulation,
constitution, or prior dispositive case. 146 Disagreement about what that law
is can be resolved by reference to the authoritative source. 147 The example
Dworkin uses is, conveniently enough, speed limits: the speed limit is what
the statutes say the speed limit is; lawyers and judges may disagree about
what the statute says, but that is ascertainable, and thus their disagreement
is resolvable, by reference to the extant, authoritative source.
148
The second way in which lawyers and judges might disagree about law
is on "theoretical" grounds. 149 In a theoretical disagreement, the actors may
agree empirically on what the statutes, regulations, constitutional
provisions, or cases say, but not on what they mean; the meaning of the law,
and thus the law itself, is contested.' 50 This is the type of disagreement with
which every law student, lawyer, law professor, and judge is deeply
139 See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 70.
140 See Rubin, supra note 12, at 1313-14.
141 Id. at 1313.




146 Id. at 7.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 4-5.
149 Id.
0 Id. at 5.
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familiar. Indeed, law teaching through the case method is often designed to
tease out Dworkin's theoretical disagreement;151 a case is read by the class,
and some unfortunate student is then called upon to explain both its
meaning and its place within the jurisprudence of that area of law, the two
of which often seem inconsistent. There are rarely clear answers; there are
only more or less persuasive arguments.
As Dworkin notes, the public seems oblivious to, and distrustful of,
theoretical disagreements in law.152 They seem to regard the law as clearly
expressed somewhere, even if they cannot locate it or describe it.'53 The
public also seems to believe that even though legal actors know where and
what the real law is, they refuse to reveal it. Instead the public believes that
legal actors purposely contrive tricky arguments to make the issues
confusing in order to advance their own political or monetary interests.
Public debate around judicial appointments often focuses on whether the
candidate will be a good judge who "finds" the law, or a bad one who
"invents" it in order to advance her own private agenda.
154
In some ways, it is this faith in the independent, empirical existence of
law that sustains, in the public eye, the legitimacy of the legal system and
the judiciary. The temple of justice itself remains sound, even if it is
currently overrun by money-changers. 155 Skeptical commentators on both
the Left and Right have argued that judges are, in fact, political actors
motivated by their own ideologies, and have called upon the courts to be
more candid about it.1 56  Calls for judicial candor are sometimes
accompanied by calls to limit the discretion, and thus power, of judges.
157
Candor, the argument goes, holds judges accountable. 58 But candor has its
151 Id.
152 Id.
"53 Id. at 7.
154 Id.; see Att'y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks of Att'y Gen. Alberto
Gonzales at George Mason University (Oct. 18, 2005) ("[Harriet Miers's] judicial
philosophy is consistent today and will be in the future with the vision laid out by the
President: that judges should interpret law faithfully, not make the law creatively.");
President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on the Supreme Court Nomination of
Anthony M. Kennedy, Central America, and Deficit Reduction (Nov. 14, 1987) ("Judge
Kennedy shares my fundamental legal philosophy of judicial restraint-the conviction that
judges should interpret the law, not make it-that, in other words, judges should be umpires,
not players.").
155 See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
156 See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1307
(1995).
157 See id.
' Id. at 1345.
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costs. The opacity of judicial decision making comes with significant
benefits that cannot be lightly discarded. One is the legitimacy of the
judiciary itself.159
The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to mask its work in an
aura of mystery to enhance its legitimacy.160 It is Merlin to the Executive's
Arthur and Congress's Lancelot; lacking an army of its own,' 6' it maintains
its power by projecting an image of secrecy and ceremony. As Barbara
Perry notes, the Court has cultivated an image of both "majesty" and
"mystery" through its language, emblems of power, and physical
environment. 162  That image validates, and exploits, the general
misapprehension of law that Dworkin describes as the "empirical" view of
legal disagreement: the law is knowable, and judges know how to find it.
Acknowledging PADs is incompatible with the courts' "empirical" image.
Courts reap the benefit of this misperception-but at a significant cost.
VI. PADS AND SYSTEM BREAKDOWN
The inability or unwillingness of formal institutions of enforcement to
formally acknowledge the existence and operation of PADs around law
helps to explain, in some instances, why courts are bedeviled by some
seemingly intractable issues, why the formal system of justice sometimes
breaks down, and why the courts sometimes issue legally baffling
159 Id. at 1388; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
172-77 (1982); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731
(1986).
160 BARBARA PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND 2 (1999).
161 President Andrew Jackson, defying the Supreme Court's decision that Cherokee
tribes could not be ethnically cleansed from the State of Georgia, is reported to have said,
"John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." H.W. BRANDS, ANDREW
JACKSON: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 493 (2005).
162 PERRY, supra note 160, at 2. The exterior of the Supreme Court was consciously
designed to evoke the popular idea of an ancient temple. Id. at 10. The great front steps and
marble columns lead to a front entrance that is flanked by two enormous marble figures
representing the "Contemplation of Justice" and the "Authority of Law." Id. They are
surrounded by torch-bearing, mask-holding angels, who symbolize the discovery of truth.
Id. The pediment displays sculptures representing "Liberty, Justice, Order, Authority,
Council, and Research Past and Present." Id. at 10-11. The interior, modeled on a French
Cathedral, id. at 10, displays frieze sculptures of Moses, Confucius, Solomon, Mohammed,
and John Marshall. Id. at 12. Spectators may speak in hushed tones until five minutes
before the Justices are to appear; then they are commanded to silence. Id. The Justices
emerge, black-robed. Id. at 15. They sit on a dais beneath carvings representing "Majesty of
Law, Power of Government, Wisdom, Justice, and the Defense of Human Rights and
Protection of the Innocent." Id. at 12.
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decisions. In this section, I examine an example of each: racial profiling,
jury nullification, and the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.
163
A. RACIAL PROFILING
Police claim that "by following any vehicle for 1 to 2 minutes they can
observe a basis on which to stop it." 16 In other words, drivers do not obey
the formal law. Having stopped a vehicle for "a legitimate traffic
violation," i.e., a violation of formal law, police can employ what the
Illinois State Police call the "the Nickel Defense," meaning they employ
their five senses to detect anything suspicious that justifies a search. 165 This
allows police to "routinely use traffic stops as a means of tracking down
drug or gun couriers. ' 66 In other words, police officers use evidence of
crimes within PADs to conduct searches for evidence of crimes outside
PADs. "[T]hese discretionary decisions are seldom documented and rarely
reviewed."
167
Of course, police decisions to enforce crimes within PADs are not
always motivated by stopping crimes outside them. They may be motivated
by illegitimate factors such as racial bias, profiteering, or some combination
of them. One particular form of such enforcement, racial profiling against
black motorists, has generated tremendous publicity and controversy and
has already reached the Supreme Court.
In Whren v. United States, the seminal racial profiling case, the
Supreme Court heard the case of two African-American men who had been
stopped for a minor traffic violation so that police could search them for
drugs. 168 The men sought to suppress evidence of drug possession, arguing
that the search had been unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
because it was motivated by the defendants' race.1 69 The Court held that
163 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
164 In one study, of 1,100 stops in Florida, 243 were made for "swerving," 128 for
driving 10 mph above the speed limit, 71 for burned out tag lights, 46 for improper license
tags, 45 for failure to signal, and others for other offenses, primarily for speeding less than
10 mph above the limit. David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544, 562 (1997). More than 70% of those stopped were African-Americans or Hispanic. Id.
African-Americans made up 12% of the driving population, but the study fails to report the
percentage made up by Hispanics, and fails to report different offending rates. Id. Of the
1,100 stops, roughly half led to searches overall, but 80% of the searches were of African-
Americans. Id. Only 9 of the 1,100 stopped received tickets. Id.
165 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 61, at 14.
166 Id.
167 See Harris, supra note 164.
168 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996).
169 Id. at 809.
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the Fourth Amendment did not protect defendants against police officers'
subjective motivations. 70 Under Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court
held, the only question was whether there was reasonable suspicion to
justify the stop. 171  Because the police could show that other,
nondiscriminatory factors caused suspicion of illegal activity, the search
was reasonable; whether the officer was also incidentally motivated by
illegal factors such as the defendant's race was irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis. 172 Similarly, in the Fourteenth Amendment context,
the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause does not
protect defendants without evidence of individual acts of deliberate
discrimination by state actors. 173 Aggregate data offered as evidence of
general disparate treatment is inadequate. 174 Despite-or perhaps because
of-the paucity of relief offered by the Court, profiling black motorists has
generated sufficient controversy and outrage that there have now been some
official efforts to curtail it. '
75
Other forms of racial profiling have received less attention. Some
evidence suggests that Hispanics may be disproportionately targeted for
pretextual stops motivated by anti-illegal immigration views 176 and the
desire to seize cash. 177 Hispanics in the United States, by population, are
more likely than members of other ethnic groups to work as migrant
170 Id. at 813.
171 Id. at 819.
172 Id.; see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that selective
enforcement claims require evidence of discriminatory intent).
17' Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469-70.
174 See id.
175 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA
COLLECTION: PROMISE PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 9 (2000).
176 Some police officers, believing that federal anti-illegal immigration efforts are
inadequate, have targeted Hispanics for minor traffic violations, then contacted federal
authorities to trigger deportation. See Paul Vitello, Path to Deportation Can Start with a
Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at At. One New York state county sheriff justified
arresting Hispanics for minor offenses and then triggering the deportation process by stating,
"We have a situation in this country where the borders are not being adequately protected."
Id. In one of the few such incidents to generate controversy, recently in Missouri an
eighteen-year old Hispanic male was stopped for driving with "excessively tinted windows."
Id. at B6. Under police interrogation, he admitted that he had entered the United States
illegally. Id. The police then triggered the deportation process against him. Id. The case
became notorious only because the police learned-after transferring his custody to the
INS-that the boy was well-known and popular in town, having spent almost his entire life
there, and was the key player on the high school soccer team that season, which was still
ongoing.
177 See William L. Anderson, Racial Profiling and State Abuse of Power,
LEwROCKWELL.COM, June 29, 2000, http://www.lewrockwell.com/anderson/anderson9.html.
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laborers. Migrant workers must travel great distances, are often paid in
cash, and are often unable to establish bank accounts during the farm work
season. In many jurisdictions, police departments are permitted to keep
cash discovered in vehicles during searches incident to traffic stops, if none
of the vehicle's occupants claim ownership of the cash. 78  In fact, many
departments depend upon the practice for part of their funding. 79 Migrant
workers are particularly vulnerable to cash seizures because they are paid in
cash, must travel, may have difficulty communicating in English, may have
entered the country illegally, and may fear deportation. 80  Biased police
officers, aware of these vulnerabilities, sometimes deliberately exploit
them.181
To date academics researching racial profiling, and litigants
challenging it, have focused their efforts on gathering statistical evidence
178 See Karen Dillon, U.S. Rules Let Police Keep Cash They Seize, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, May 21, 2000, at IA. Of course, any number of reasons might motivate the
occupants not to claim the cash: fear of arrest, inability to speak or understand English, fear
for their safety, fear that the money will be used as evidence against them for a crime they
have committed. The least likely reason seems to be genuine lack of ownership.
179 See id. at 15A. The head of the Albuquerque police special investigations unit
estimates that 75% of the unit's $1 million cost each year is funded by cash seized from
motorists during searches.
180 See Anderson, supra note 177.
181 A recent discussion on an on-line forum for police officers helps to demonstrate the
depth and danger of the problem. Police Forums & Law Enforcement Forums @
Officer.com-Tricky Traffic Stops, http://forums.officer.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-
33874.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Tricky Traffic Stops]. It was started by
a police officer recounting an experience with a traffic stop and asking for advice from other
officers. Posting by ufresfave to id. (July 27, 2005, 07:30). The officer had stopped a
dilapidated car for speeding. Id. The driver and passengers were Hispanic, appeared to be
migrant laborers, and spoke little English. "[The passenger] suddenly no speak the english
either. We get consent to search (in a sense) and find 10,000 in cash. Well no can claim it,
bc no one speaka the english, as I said earlier." Id. To the officer's disappointment, a
passenger claimed ownership of the cash when he realized the police officer intended to keep
it: "Woulda loved to bring 10k home to the chief." Posting by ufresdave to Tricky Traffic
Stops, supra (July 27, 2005, 18:55). The officer then sought the opinions of other officers:
how could he have kept the cash? One officer replied:
If I stopped normal Joe Blow citizen with $10,000 cash and he told me that he had just sold a
used car and was on his way to the bank to deposit the money, the interview is over.... On the
other hand, if Jose Blow was speeding, unlicensed, in an "un-car" and with $10,000 he claims no
knowledge of, he takes a ride to the house.... [The cash] would be returned as soon as he
provides proof of ownership. He could do that on the same day he appears in court to answer the
speeder and other coupons I gave him.(yeah right!)
Posting by duckfan to Tricky Traffic Stops, supra (July 27, 2005, 14:03). A second officer
agreed: "Like the man said, seize the money and let the [sic] proove [sic] to the court they
have it legally.... If they were Americans, it'd probably be a tougher sell. But as it was?
Nah." Posting by Centurion 44 to Tricky Traffic Stops, supra (Aug. 1, 2005, 14:44).
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that tends to reveal whether minorities are stopped in disproportion to their
population, and on whether race is a statistically significant predictor of
stops. 182 Unfortunately, as Bernard Harcourt has insightfully explained,
these data are of little use for determining whether stops are unlawfully
motivated, because not only do they fail to account for differential
offending rates, they also fail to account for differences in elasticity in
response to enforcement.' 83 As Harcourt demonstrates, police behavior
alone is an inadequate focus of study; the behavior of the regulated must be
studied as well.
184
But there is a second, more fundamental problem with these studies.
Even if the data is corrected to account for offending rates and elasticity in
response to enforcement, it is still of little use if mere illegality is enough to
justify otherwise unlawfully motivated enforcement. For example, if the
parameter of acceptable deviance for driving behavior is ten miles per hour
above the formal speed limit, and an unlawfully motivated officer can
justify stopping a driver driving seven miles an hour above the limit
because the driver's behavior is formally illegal, the driver has no
recourse-unless courts acknowledge PADs.
18 5
In other words, to protect the regulated from selective enforcement,
courts must examine not whether the defendant's behavior violates the law,
but rather whether it occurred within PADs. But in order to do that, courts
must abandon the formal fiction that normally law is enforced and instead
acknowledge that what is enforced are the normative standards arrived at
through negotiation and through practice between the regulated and their
regulators. The unwillingness or inability of courts to acknowledge PADs
thus undermines their ability to perform one of the fundamental tasks with
which they are entrusted: protection of minority populations against state
actors unlawfully motivated by racial bias.
182 See JOYCE MCMAHON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, How TO CORRECTLY COLLECT
AND ANALYZE RACIAL PROFILING DATA: YOUR REPUTATION DEPENDS ON IT! FINAL PROJECT
REPORT FOR RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS (2002).
183 Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1275 (2004).
184 Id.
185 In one study of the New Jersey Turnpike, of 1,768 observed motorists, more than
98% were speeding. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA




Exercise of Discretionary Enforcement by Normative and Legal Status of
Behavior
Formally Legal Formally Illegal
Within PADs
Outside PADs
To determine whether or not enforcement, or non-enforcement, is
suspect, legal analysts should determine where the illegal behavior
justifying the stop fits within the 2x2 box in Figure 1, reproduced above.
Stops justified by behavior that falls within the upper right-hand box-in
other words, behavior that is formally illegal but within PADs-should be
subject to heightened scrutiny.
Unless courts acknowledge PADs, they are left with very limited
instruments to redress unlawfully motivated enforcement. One such
instrument is the review of administrative action under the "abuse of
discretion" standard. 186 But the limitations of that instrument are obvious:
as long as there is a rational basis for the exercise of enforcement discretion
in the manner in which it was exercised, there is no abuse of discretion, and
the exercise is insulated from review. 187 This makes the abuse of discretion
standard of review particularly ill-suited as a tool to challenge enforcement
actions against behaviors that are formally illegal but within PADs.
Because the abuse of discretion standard allows enforcement to survive
challenge if it has any rational basis, enforcers can immunize their acts by
186 See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary






evidence that the enforced-against behavior was formally illegal. After all,
under the formal fiction, enforcers' raison d'etre is the enforcement of
formal law; one can hardly argue that enforcers have no rational basis for
fulfilling their reason for being. Consequently, the abuse of discretion
standard does nothing to help courts protect those harmed by the formal
fiction.
Perhaps the most straightforward method of applying heightened
scrutiny is through burden-shifting. Harcourt has suggested an equal
protection burden-shifting analysis in racial profiling cases based upon the
Batson model, used to prevent racial discrimination in the use of
preemptory jury challenges. 188 Under Harcourt's proposal, the defendant
would establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation by
presenting "statistical discrepancies in the race of persons searched."' 189 The
state would then have the burden of showing either that there are "race-
neutral reasons" for the disparities, or that race is a statistically significant
predictor of crime and its use is designed to maximize search success
without unduly burdening minority populations. 190 The defendant would
then have the opportunity to rebut the state's evidence. Harcourt's model is
designed to relieve the defendant of the burden of proving "actual
intentional discrimination by a police officer."' 191 The defendant's burden is
merely to present credible evidence of statistical disparities. 92 It is then the
state's burden to prove that factors other than intentional discrimination
lead to, and justify, the stop.
193
Harcourt's model is useful in that it addresses a central problem in the
racial profiling analysis: it moves the burden of proving intent (or its
absence) from the defendant to the state. However, Harcourt's model does
not correct the blind spot undermining older models: it does not correct the
fiction that law is the thing that police enforce. What is needed is a model
that acknowledges that the limit of acceptable deviance is the thing that
police enforce. A burden-shifting model that acknowledged PADs would,
like its predecessors, rely upon behavioral statistics. But the focus would
not be on police behavior by target population, or even on the elasticity of
drivers' response by race, but rather on the behavior of both the regulated
and their regulators in order to determine the location of PADs.
188 See Harcourt, supra note 183, at 1347.
189 Id.
190 Id.





Put simply, the model might work like this: if a person with immutable
characteristics has been stopped for behavior within parameters of
normatively acceptable deviance, then the burden should shift to the state to
articulate a reason for the act of enforcement that is neither based on
immutable characteristics nor on behaviors within PADs.
Figure 13
Racial Profiling Burden-Shifting Model
Prosecution's burden Defendant's burden






The flow diagram in Figure 13 suggests a series of burden shifts
designed to allow courts to ensure that prosecutions are not unlawfully
motivated. A defendant moving either to dismiss a charge or to suppress
evidence on the basis of the enforcer's unlawful motivation would have the
initial burden of establishing that the behavior that lead to the enforcement
action was within the community's PADs, and that enforcement against it is
unusual. If the defendant can meet her burden, the burden would then shift
to the enforcer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for, in
this unusual instance, enforcing the formal law against behavior that is
within PADs. If the enforcer cannot meet that burden, the court should act
to protect the defendant against unlawfully motivated enforcement; if the
enforcer can meet that burden, the prosecution should proceed.
This type of analysis seems odd on its face, but is not entirely
unfamiliar to courts. 194 Courts perform a similar task in the context of First
Amendment challenges to enforcement actions against alleged obscenity. 95
In obscenity cases, courts are called upon to examine evidence of
community standards, make judgments about what those standards are, and
compare them to the enforced-against expression.196 Courts then decide
whether the enforced-against expression is within or outside community
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standards.197 In other words, courts must determine whether the challenged
expression is within PADs.
Courts would actually be in a better position to determine whether
certain behaviors are within PADs, as opposed to certain expressions. In
expression cases, courts must make subjective judgments about normative
values based primarily on anecdotal evidence. In behavior cases, courts can
make objective judgments on the location of PADs based upon empirical
data. For example, in cases involving traffic stops, litigants can present the
court with extensive driving behavior data maintained by administrative
agencies, such as the data I have used in this Article.
Like almost all procedural devices, the practical effect of burden-
shifting based on PADs would likely be quite small in the court room.198
But outside the court room-where most cases are resolved' 99-the effect
could be significant. Defendants armed with evidence that their behavior is
within PADs would be in a better bargaining position than they are now.
Busy prosecutors may be more inclined to offer favorable plea bargaining
agreements, and may be less willing to support charges for crimes
discovered through unlawfully motivated enforcement against behavior
that, though illegal, is within PADs.
B. JURY NULLIFICATION
Jury nullification is a phenomenon that probably would not exist but
for the operation of unacknowledged PADs. Jury nullification gives
expression to two distinct, opposite phenomena mentioned earlier:
acceptable deviance, and unacceptable compliance.
Juries confronted with a defendant charged with conduct that is
formally illegal but within PADs may nullify the legally appropriate verdict
in favor of the normatively appropriate one. Nullification inspired by
acceptable deviance results, in criminal trials, in acquittal despite the jurors'
belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime.
In the civil context, it results in a finding of no liability even though the
jurors believe that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the
defendant is liable in tort.
197 See id.
198 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994); see also Robert H. Mnookin &
Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v.
Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295 (1989).




Jury Verdict and Nullification by Normative and Legal Status of Behavior
Formally Legal or Compliant Formally Illegal or Deviant
Nullification =not guilty
Within PADs Not guilty Nliiain=ntgitEx: racial bias against victim
Nullification = guiltyOutside PADs Git
Ex: racial bias against defendant
As Hannaford-Agor and Hans note, several renowned instances of jury
nullification in American history "have been heralded as courageous
examples of political protest and moral integrity. °200 For example, jury
nullification is commonly credited with sparing some violators of the
Fugitive Slave Act, Prohibition, and draft laws during the Vietnam War.20'
In other words, in some times and places, aiding escaped slaves,
manufacturing alcohol, and resisting the draft were within PADs though
formally illegal. In each case, prosecutors and courts could not or would
not accommodate PADs. Negotiation-through-practice had failed to
produce a parameter of deviance acceptable to both regulators and the
regulated. Faced with this disjuncture, jurors were forced to "reconcile
literal application of the criminal statute with principles and norms
implicated in the case. 20 2 Some juries refused to comply with formal law
and instead enforced their own normative standards of acceptability.20 3 The
200 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse
from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1249,
1256 (2003).
201 See id.
202 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1174 (1997).
203 See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 200, at 1276-77. Jurors' perceptions of the fairness
of the law allegedly violated, and the outcome for the defendant of guilty verdict, may color
perceptions about the strength of the evidence. Thus it is very difficult even for jurors
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strength of their fidelity to normatively acceptable standards is revealed by
their willingness to enforce them despite personal risk.204 Although at
common law jurors have been immune from prosecution for voting their
consciences, they have sometimes been prosecuted after nullification for
violating their jurors' oaths by refusing to adhere to the law.20 5
Today, nullification resulting in acquittal is thought to occur most
commonly in "three-strikes" cases and drug cases. 20 6 Hannaford-Agor and
Hans make a distinction between jurors' concerns about the fairness of the
law itself, on the one hand, and the fairness of the outcome of a guilty
verdict for the defendant, on the other.207  This distinction seems
particularly important in "three-strikes" cases, which can impose enormous
penalties for relatively minor offenses, and in those drug cases where small
amounts of drugs can result in long sentences. In such cases, the jury may
find the defendant's conduct outside of PADs, but may also find the
punishment that will be imposed normatively unacceptable. If the legal
penalty is less acceptable than the illegal conduct, juries may vote to acquit
despite believing the defendant guilty.
20 8
Some scholars argue that unjust acquittals should not be considered
acts of nullification. 20 9 But nullification, on its own terms, is neither just
nor unjust. Whether the result is just or unjust, nullification is the product
of the same phenomena: juries preferring PADs over law. So, normatively
acceptable deviance may include unlawful acts that are also unjust. For
example, in some times and places, juries might acquit white supremacist
defendants who, beyond a reasonable doubt, had killed or assaulted
African-American civil rights workers. 210 Historically, juries may also have
nullified the law by acquitting murderous cuckolded husbands, rapists
"enticed" by their victims, violent nationalists, and others whose conduct
was formally illegal but, by the normative sensibilities of their time and
place, within PADs.
2 11
In addition to just and unjust acquittals, jury nullification may-and
perhaps most commonly does--take the form of unjust convictions. In
themselves to say whether a vote to acquit was based on their perception of the fairness of
the law or outcome, or the strength of the evidence.
204 Id. at 1262-63 (citing People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999)).
205 Id.
206 See id. at 1263; see also Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 337 (2002).
207 See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 200, at 1263.
208 See Marder, supra note 206, at 354.





other words, juries may convict a defendant even if they are not convinced
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if some other characteristic of the
defendant or his conduct is considered unacceptably deviant. Juries may be
likely to convict a defendant that they find unacceptably deviant, as
opposed to a defendant with whom the jury shares common normative
sensibilities, even if the evidence of the particular crime with which the
defendant is charged is the same. For example, jurors may be inclined to
convict a defendant covered in gang-insignia tattoos, even if the evidence
that he committed the crime with which he was charged is not strong.
Similarly, juries may be inclined to sanction members of formally legal-
but normatively unacceptably deviant-religions, or professions, or
political organizations. The normatively unacceptable behavior is not
illegal, which makes formal enforcement against it impossible. But because
the behavior is normatively unacceptable, the community may welcome the
opportunity to impose sanctions that formal institutions of enforcement
cannot.
2 12
Few scholars have considered unjust convictions instances of jury
nullification, but they are logically identical to jury nullifications resulting
in acquittal: they are the product of jurors preferencing PADs over law.
Just or unjust, conviction or acquittal, the phenomenon is the same.
Moreover, by excluding cases that result in convictions, scholars ignore the
phenomenon of unacceptable compliance and miss what is, quite possibly,
the majority of jury nullifications.
C. BUSH V. GORE
Bush v. Gore213 is still a hot potato, at least within the legal
academy.214 But my purpose in this very brief discussion of the case is not
to argue whether the decision was right or wrong. My purpose is much
simpler: it is to argue that an understanding of the existence and operation
of PADs, and the formalization paradox they produce, casts a new
perspective on the decision.
In Bush v. Gore, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in a
way it had not before and, it suggested, it never would again, to re-interpret
212 In that way, nullification in the form of conviction for legally permissible-but
normatively unacceptable-behavior is different in degree but not in kind from the social
sanctions imposed on slow drivers.
213 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
214 See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore?,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643 (2005); Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal
Judiciary: An Unconstitutional Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 61 (2006); Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the
States: Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL. L. REv. 229 (2006).
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Florida state law in a manner that contradicted the Florida Supreme Court's
week-old interpretation of the same statute.215 Even setting aside the
opinion's practical effect-deciding who would be President-it was
extraordinary as a matter of legal reasoning. Laurence Tribe, although
admittedly partisan, fairly summarized the reaction to the opinion of many
observers, regardless of political stripe: "[W]here the hell did that come
from?"
216
For some legal scholars, there is no question that the Court's decision
was wrong; the only issue is whether it was "unprincipled or merely
indefensible. 2 17 In other words, the debate centers on whether the decision
was politically-motivated or just mistaken. In this camp, Tribe believes the
decision was just mistaken;218 Judge Calabresi, by contrast, describes it as
an "unprincipled," "dangerous," "legally incoherent outcome-
determinative" holding. 21 9 Other legal scholars support the ruling.220 Like
the detractors, the supporters fall into two camps: those who argue the
decision was correct, and those who argue the decision was good enough,
given the circumstances. 22' Nelson Lund argues that the decision was
correct as a matter of law.222 Judge Posner, by contrast, argues only that
given the near impossibility of the situation it found itself in, the Court
223arrived at a reasonable decision.
If we acknowledge the existence of PADs and the operation of the
formalization paradox, then Posner's explanation may come closest to the
mark. The Court found itself in a rare situation in which formal institutions
are likely to stumble: a formal fiction was suddenly laid bare. The Court
was faced with a crisis always latent, now made manifest, in an electoral
and judicial system of unacknowledged PADs: elections take place within
parameters of acceptable deviance. Usually, the parameters of deviance
within election administration go unnoticed because the margin of votes
215 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for
the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.").
216 Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REv. 170, 222 (2001).
217 Id. at 270.
218 Id. at 222.
219 Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but not Partisan) Praise of Principle, in BUSH V. GORE:
THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
220 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v.
Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1219 (2002).
221 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 220; Lund, supra note 220.
222 See Lund, supra note 220.
223 See POSNER, supra note 220, at 134.
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between the leading candidates is greater than the margin of error. 4
Florida's presidential election in 2000 was an exception: it was a statistical
tie,225 and always would be no matter how many times the votes were
counted and recounted, and no matter how "votes" were defined.226
The very public demonstration of regulators' inability to tally votes
reliably and completely undermined a formal fiction important to the
American sense of political identity-that every vote counts.227 That fiction
is undermined by the discovery that elections take place within PADs.
Discovering that, in fact, every vote does not count and never had, peeled
back that formal fiction.
Formal fictions have an important role in preserving our view of
ourselves: police officers enforce the formal law; judges find the law by
reference to an extant authoritative source; in our elections, every vote
counts. The crack in that last formal fiction occasioned by the revelation
that we have always had PADs in elections challenged the polity's sense of
itself. Indeed, it triggered a type of societal identity crisis that found clear
expression in a question asked repeatedly, with a sense of utter disbelief: "Is
this really America?" 228 That rhetorical cry is a familiar response when
formal fictions are challenged by the unavoidable reality of PADs.
In Bush v. Gore in particular, the Court found itself between the rock
of the formal fiction and the hard place of the formalization paradox. If it
refused to disavow the formal fiction and instead acknowledged the
224 See Steve Bickerstaff, Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida: The Anatomy of
Defeat and Victory, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 149, 163 (2002) ("In the reality of elections
involving possibly millions of ballots, votes in an election are seldom fully and accurately
counted because every method of counting votes has some margin of error. Most elections,
however, are not nearly close enough to fall within this margin of error.").
225 See POSNER, supra note 220, at 49-50 ("Bush's original margin of 930 votes out of six
million made the Florida Presidential election a statistical tie. Because the counting of
millions of ballots by any method is liable to error, a razor-thin margin of victory such as
Bush received establishes merely a probability-and not necessarily or in this case a very
high one-that the victor actually received more votes than the vanquished. That is what I
mean in calling the vote in Florida a statistical tie. The central question is whether a fair
recount would have broken the tie. I think not.").
226 See id.
227 See id. at 43 ("The right to vote is a symbol of equality. It dramatizes the principle
that every person is to count for one and no one for more than one, at least in the political
sphere. This may be hokum or sentimentality, or even a mask for the inequalities of
circumstance and opportunity that pervade our (as every) society; but it is a brute fact about
the American political culture.").
228 For example, Florida State Senator Tom Risson asked on the floor of the state senate,
"What the hell is going on here? ... Is this America?" Susan Milligan, Gore in Heated
Battle on 2 Fronts in Florida Presses Case for New Tally, Seeks to Block Lawmakers,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al.
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existence of election administration PADs, it would demand an impossible
and unworkable level of formal compliance from election administrators.
As a result, "successful contests-in the sense of contests eventuating in
judicial orders for selective or comprehensive hand recounts or even for
revotes-would be the norm in close elections. 229
On the other hand, if the Court acknowledged that election
administration takes place within PADs, that acknowledgement might shift
the PADs surrounding election administration, creating more room for
deviance. Moreover, for the Court to acknowledge that it could not turn to
an extant, authoritative source of law to tell us who could legitimately claim
the Presidency would undermine the "empirical" view of the law, and thus
the courts' institutional legitimacy as its guardian. The priests of law's
temple could hardly return from behind their velvet curtain, only to report
that the oracle had shrugged its shoulders and said "close enough."
In addition, the inability to resolve the competing legal claims to the
Presidency may have triggered a political crisis with no foreseeable
resolution.230 In this regard, the formal fiction protects not just the Court's
place within the polity, but the cohesion of the polity itself. Calabresi
explains that a judge's lack of candor can usefully hide "a fundamental
value conflict, recognition of which would be too destructive for the
particular society to accept., 23 1 Insisting on the formal fiction's reality may
protect the polity from a destructive crisis.
The Court recognized the difficulty it was in, protesting that it had to
shoulder "unsought responsibility" and was being "forced to confront"
issues it would rather not.232 It stated that its foremost concern in deciding
the case was "to sustain the confidence that all citizens must have in the
outcome of elections. 233
What the Court needed was a pragmatic solution that would end the
crisis, but one veiled in the cloak of the formal fiction. As Judge Posner
notes, the Court was hesitant "to acknowledge the pragmatic grounds" of its
229 POSNER, supra note 220, at 120-21.
230 The Onion newspaper satirized the crisis by reporting that Washington was littered
with corpses and burning tanks from pitched battles between Republicans and Democrats. It
also reported that President Clinton had declared himself President-for-Life, burned the
Constitution, and dissolved Congress, scoffing that opponents could bring their complaints
"to the impotent courts." For a collection of related articles, see The Onion-America's
Finest News Source, http://www.theonion.com/content/index/3641 (last visited Nov. 24,
2006).
231 CALABRESI, supra note 159, at 172.
232 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
233 Id. at 109.
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constitutional decisions lest it appear "lawless. 234 But, he argues, the Bush
v. Gore decision can only be "explained and defended" by "positing
pragmatism as the hidden ground of decision., 235 In the end, faced with an
insoluble dilemma, the Court covered itself with a curtain hastily
constructed out of the Equal Protection Clause, and Wizard-of-Oz-like,
urged the nation to ignore the Justices behind it.
236
Tribe laments that the Court's decision evinced "a deep-seated concern
with how things look, rather than how things are. 237 As Tribe described it,
the Court seemed chiefly concerned with maintaining some "prescribed
level of popular confidence in the results of the election" 238 rather than with
requiring enforcement of the formal law. Protecting the formal fiction does
require a concern with appearance and with maintaining popular confidence
in the institutions of enforcement. Acknowledging PADs is not only an
admission of imperfection; it may also be an invitation to greater
imperfection through the formalization paradox, as new PADs form around
the acknowledged standard. Moreover, in cases such as Bush v. Gore,
acknowledging PADs may trigger both a social identity and structural
political crisis. In averting a "genuine constitutional crisis," Cass Sunstein
opines, "the Court might have done the nation a big favor" even though it
may have "abandoned the law simply because of pragmatic concerns.
239
Whether the benefits of preserving the formal fiction were truly worth
the cost is a question I will not address. But to understand the otherwise
baffling ruling of the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, it helps to
acknowledge that the formal fiction is at work, obscuring the existence and
operation of PADs.
VII. CONCLUSION
We are governed neither by law nor norm, but rather by
unacknowledged parameters of deviance acceptable to the regulated and
their regulators, informed by law and norm in an endogenous and
constantly evolving system. The location of the parameters of acceptable
deviance is set by negotiation-through-practice between the regulated and
their regulators over time.
234 POSNER, supra note 220, at 173-75.
235 Id.
236 See NOEL LANGLEY, FLORENCE RYERSON & EDGAR ALLAN WOOLF, THE WIZARD OF
Oz: THE SCREENPLAY (Michael Patrick Hearn ed., 1989).
237 Tribe, supra note 216, at 254.
238 See id. at 253.
239 Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 757, 769 (2001).
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Understanding how PADs shift with changes in the formal law could
allow lawmakers to predict the behavioral effect of adjustments in
regulation, a potentially useful tool. But the fact that PADs shift with
changes in the formal law also prevents formal institutions of enforcement
from acknowledging their existence and operation, because to do so
formalizes them. When they are formalized, new PADs are created around
them. I have called this phenomenon the formalization paradox. In order to
avoid the formalization paradox, formal institutions of enforcement claim to
enforce the law, when in fact they usually enforce PADs. I have called the
refusal to formally acknowledge that PADs are the true point of
enforcement the formal fiction. The formal fiction avoids the formalization
paradox; it can also enhance the court's "empirical" legitimacy, and divert
the polity from fundamental identity crises.
But the formal fiction has a substantial cost for some segments of the
population. The refusal to formally acknowledge that enforcement occurs
at PADs can leave some vulnerable to enforcement practices that are
formally justified but improperly motivated. And until we acknowledge
that, we will never be able to come to grips with legally bedeviling
phenomena like racial profiling.
As long as courts find their legitimacy enhanced by the formal fiction
they are unlikely to discard it. But as public institutions, courts should
teach the public, not enjoy the advantage of its ignorance. The threat to the
legitimacy of courts in acknowledging PADs cannot outweigh their
responsibility to prevent misuse of the courts by improperly motivated
regulators.
But in the end, the needed reforms lie not within formal institutions,
but within the populace itself. We need a more mature and nuanced
understanding of law as a social practice. A more mature understanding,
hopefully, would reduce the effect of the formalization paradox and would
help protect those whose behavior is formally illegal, but within PADs,
from unscrupulous enforcers motivated by characteristics other than the
defendant's behavior.
Moreover, there is something inherently democratic in recognizing that
the relationship between the regulated and their regulators is dynamic, its
terms negotiated through practice. Acknowledging that rightly locates the
law not behind the wizard's curtain, or the judge's robe, or the
bureaucracy's labyrinth, but on the table between the state and its citizens.
And that has pedagogical importance, too, for law teachers; good
lawyers understand that the law is a point of reference, not an answer. We
should impart to our students a more mature understanding of the role of
law in society. Failing to acknowledge that we behave within parameters of
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deviance, guided neither by law nor norm alone, but rather a normative
sensibility informed by law, distorts our understanding of law as a social
practice.
So, in answer to my original question, I offer two definitions:
One: the speed limit is a formal standard around which, by
negotiation-through-practice over time, we construct unacknowledged
parameters of normatively acceptable deviance, informed by norms and are
anchored by formal law, that guide both behavior and enforcement.
Two: about 74 mph, but don't hold me to it.
